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In search of organisational virtue in business:  
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Abstract 
 
In this paper we argue that MacIntyre’s virtues-goods-practice-institution schema 
(MacIntyre 1985) provides a conceptual framework within which organisational 
virtue in general, and virtue in business in particular, can be explored. A heuristic 
device involving levels of individual agency, mode of institutionalisation and 
environment is used to discuss why some businesses protect practices, develop virtues 
and encourage the exercise of moral agency in their decision-making, whilst others 
struggle or fail to do so. 
 
In relation to conventional shareholder-owned capitalist business, both the mode of 
institutionalisation and the environment are shown to be largely antithetical to the 
development of practices. Other businesses may meet the necessary internal 
conditions for the sustenance of practice-like features but remain dependent upon 
features within their environments. To illustrate this we use participant observation to 
show how one particular organisation – Traidcraft plc – meets the relevant conditions. 
 
Introduction 
 
Patrons are reminded that they are required to keep as 
quiet as possible when artists are performing. If you are 
disturbed by noise from other patrons we would be grateful 
if you would inform any one of our staff.  Thank you. 
 
(Notice placed on every table inside Ronnie Scott’s Jazz 
Club, Frith Street, London and noted by one of the authors 
in the summer of 2004.) 
 
Why do some businesses actively protect the virtues of the practices they house whilst 
others do not? 
 
In order to explore the concept and existence (or otherwise) of organisational virtue 
there is a need for some kind of integrating framework, a heuristic device which 
encourages fruitful discussion. Without this, discussion is likely to degenerate into a 
rather general plea for individuals to cultivate the virtues in organisational life. 
 
Our first contention is that MacIntyre’s virtues-goods-practice-institution schema 
provides just such a conceptual framework, but our second is that the dynamics of the 
inter-relations between the elements of this schema requires more systematic 
consideration than is evident in the extant literature. This paper attempts this by 
applying familiar levels concepts from systems theory – the agent, the institution and 
the environment – to MacIntyre’s schema and to a business organisation with which 
one of us has had a continuing association (Traidcraft plc). 
 
The paper begins by outlining MacIntyre’s conceptual framework of virtues, goods, 
practices and institutions, characterises the virtuous business organisation, and 
describes the levels notions of the agent, institution and environment. It draws some 
tentative conclusions as to relationships between the features of the levels and the 
likelihood of institutional protection of virtue-embodying practices and concludes by 
considering and drawing out implications from the case of Traidcraft plc. 
 
Before commencing, however, there are two points which we should note. The first is 
that MacIntyre’s concerns are with bureaucratic organisations in general “whether in 
the form of private corporations or of government agencies” (MacIntyre 1985: 25), 
and his characterisation of bureaucratic managers is similarly generic rather than 
specific to corporations. Our focus in this paper, however, is specifically with 
business organisations and as such, while many of the issues that MacIntyre’s 
framework addresses might equally be applicable to bureaucratic organisations in 
general, we do not directly address this issue. 
 
The second point is that MacIntyre’s understanding of capitalist organisations draws 
heavily on what has been termed “managerial capitalism”, although elements of 
“investor capitalism” (see Nielsen 2002) or “stock market capitalism” (Handy 2002) 
are also readily observable in his work. MacIntyre himself accepts that different 
capitalisms exist, and in the 1995 preface to the republication of his 1953 Marxism 
and Christianity he argues that the social democratic form (which we may take as 
being close to the “stakeholder” form – see Hutton (1995) but also Hampden-Turner 
& Trompenaars (1993)), is inevitably vulnerable to the incorporation and destruction 
of trade unions and a consequent return to a form in which “[w]orkers would so far as 
possible be returned to the condition of mere instruments of capital formation” 
(MacIntyre 1995: xv). The extent, then, to which different forms of capitalism are 
more or less conducive to organisational virtue is an important question, but one 
which we can address only indirectly here. We will, however, return to both these 
points briefly in our conclusions. 
 
MacIntyre’s virtues-goods-practice-institution schema 
 
Goods, practices and institutions 
 
The significance of MacIntyre’s work in general and its application to contemporary 
organisations has been addressed in the first paper of this Special Issue. From this it is 
clear that MacIntyre’s arguments for and developments of virtue ethics, and their 
application specifically to the area of business, are already well documented and have 
received critical review (see Beadle 2002; Moore 2002, 2005a, 2005b, for example). 
In order to explore this further here, however, we begin by returning to MacIntyre’s 
oft-quoted definition of a practice: 
 
“Any coherent and complex form of socially established cooperative human 
activity through which goods internal to that form of activity are realized in 
the course of trying to achieve those standards of excellence which are 
appropriate to, and partially definitive of, that form of activity, with the result 
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that human powers to achieve excellence, and human conceptions of the ends 
and goods involved, are systematically extended.” (MacIntyre 1985: 187) 
 
Internal goods derived from practices, both the excellence of products and the 
perfection of the individual in the process (MacIntyre 1985: 189-190 and see also 
MacIntyre 1994: 284 and further below), can be contrasted with external goods such 
as fame, power, profit or, more generally, success. When achieved, MacIntyre argues, 
these external goods are “always some individual's property and possession. [They 
are] characteristically objects of competition in which there must be losers as well as 
winners” (MacIntyre 1985: 190). With internal goods, however, although there is 
competition in one sense, this is competition to excel and so benefits all members of 
the community engaged in the practice (MacIntyre 1985: 190-191). 
 
In order for practices to flourish, however, institutions are required to provide for their 
sustenance:  
 
“Institutions are characteristically and necessarily concerned with ... external 
goods. They are involved in acquiring money and other material goods; they 
are structured in terms of power and status, and they distribute money, power 
and status as rewards. Nor could they do otherwise if they are to sustain not 
only themselves, but also the practices of which they are the bearers. For no 
practices can survive for any length of time unsustained by institutions. Indeed 
so intimate is the relationship of practices to institutions – and consequently of 
the goods external to the goods internal to the practices in question – that 
institutions and practices characteristically form a single causal order in which 
the ideals and the creativity of the practice are always vulnerable to the 
acquisitiveness of the institution, in which the cooperative care for common 
goods of the practice is always vulnerable to the competitiveness of the 
institution. In this context the essential feature of the virtues is clear. Without 
them, without justice, courage and truthfulness, practices could not resist the 
corrupting power of institutions.” (MacIntyre 1985: 194) 
 
MacIntyre’s description of institutions and their relationship with practices can be 
applied in almost any context. MacIntyre himself indicates that, “the range of 
practices is wide: arts, sciences, games, politics in the Aristotelian sense, the making 
and sustaining of family life, all fall under the concept” (MacIntyre 1985: 188). Our 
argument here is that this can be extended to include organisational life in general and 
business organisations in particular. But the essential association and tension between 
practices and institutions, and between internal and external goods, gives the texture 
of organisational life a central dilemma. We depict this as follows and explore this 
dilemma further below: 
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PRACTICE 
 
Concerned with the 
exercise of virtue 
and the 
achievement of 
internal goods 
INSTITUTION 
 
Concerned with the achievement 
of external goods 
 
 
 
 
 
 
MacIntyre acknowledged that in After Virtue he did not pay particular attention to 
what he termed “productive practices”. He later made good that lack of attention by 
referring specifically to productive crafts such as “farming and fishing, architecture 
and construction …”: 
 
“The aim internal to such productive crafts, when they are in good order, is 
never only to catch fish, or to produce beef or milk, or to build houses. It is to 
do so in a manner consonant with the excellences of the craft, so that there is 
not only a good product, but the craftsperson is perfected through and in her or 
his activity.” (MacIntyre 1994: 284) 
 
But what is it that enables the craftsperson to seek and realize such perfection? To 
answer this question requires commentary on MacIntyre’s notion of virtue and its 
relationship to goods, practices and institutions. 
 
Virtues and institutional governance 
 
MacIntyre initially defines the virtues as: 
 
“dispositions not only to act in particular ways but also to feel in particular 
ways. To act virtuously … is to act from inclination formed by the cultivation 
of the virtues.” (MacIntyre 1985: 149) 
 
But he later links virtues, goods and practices more specifically: 
 
 “A virtue is an acquired human quality the possession and exercise of which 
tends to enable us to achieve those goods which are internal to practices and 
the lack of which effectively prevents us from achieving any such goods.” 
(MacIntyre 1985: 191) 
 
Virtues, therefore, are enduring character traits (as, of course, are vices), not practice-
specific, but spanning and necessary to the flourishing of any practice. The virtues, 
however, receive their full warrant in the context of the notion of a narrative quest 
towards one’s telos – the good as such: “[t]he virtues are precisely those qualities the 
possession of which will enable an individual to achieve eudaimonia and the lack of 
which will frustrate his movement toward that telos” (MacIntyre 1985: 148). (The 
telos, or purpose or good, of human life is given the name eudaimonia by Aristotle. 
MacIntyre translates this as something like, “blessedness, happiness, prosperity. It is 
the state of being well and doing well, of a man’s being well-favoured himself and in 
relation to the divine” (MacIntyre 1985: 148).) 
 
The virtues enable the individual to achieve the goods internal to practices, and the 
achievement of those goods across a variety of practices and over time is 
instrumental in the individual’s search for and movement towards their own telos.  
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Characteristically, the importance of the virtues for agents is first realised through 
early participation in and witness of practices. Such experience demonstrates the 
inherence of such attributes as courage, justice, fortitude and temperance to the 
successful achievement of goods internal to practices. Contingence, rather than 
inherence, however, marks their relations to the acquisition of external goods. 
 
To return briefly to the quotation with which we began, when the institutional 
managers of Ronnie Scott’s decided to place notices on every table in the club we may 
reasonably infer that they sought, (perhaps among other things) to protect the 
musicians’ practice (and hence the exercise of their virtues) from some customers’ 
behaviour. 
 
But this leads us to another important point in MacIntyre’s framework: 
 
“the making and sustaining of forms of human community – and therefore of 
institutions – itself has all the characteristics of a practice, and moreover of a 
practice which stands in a peculiarly close relationship to the exercise of the 
virtues …” (MacIntyre 1985: 194, emphasis added). 
 
In other words, senior managers – those who have, in one sense, outgrown the 
practice and now represent the institution that houses it – also have the same 
opportunity to exercise the virtues in the making and sustaining of the institution 
(enabling them on their own narrative quest towards their own telos). This more 
complex schema may be represented by the diagram below where the smaller circle 
with the “P” inside represents the practice of making and sustaining the institution. (It 
is quite likely that many institutions will house more than one practice. For simplicity, 
however, we assume a single practice within any particular institution.) 
 
 
 
PRACTICE 
 
Concerned with the 
exercise of virtue 
and the 
achievement of 
internal goods 
 P INSTITUTION 
 
Concerned with the achievement 
of external goods 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
MacIntyre, in drawing attention to the central dilemma of his schema, notes that, 
“practices are often distorted by their modes of institutionalisation, when irrelevant 
considerations relating to money, power and status are allowed to invade the practice” 
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(MacIntyre 1994: 289). Thus, an important part of the whole virtues-goods-practice-
institution schema is to focus on the level of the institution in order to assess what 
features of the institution will better enable it not to distort the practice that it houses. 
And equally, there is a need to focus on the virtues necessary to sustain what we 
might call such virtuous institutional forms. Following from this, we can ask what 
would characterize an institution in good order, one that protects and perhaps extends 
the excellences of the practice it houses. 
 
The character of the virtuous institution 
 
Evidence from a variety of studies (Akaah and Riordan 1989; Baumhart 1961; 
Brenner and Molander 1977, for example) highlights the importance of peer and 
superior influence on the ethical behaviour of managers. It has been argued (Klein 
1988 and Moore 2005b) that an appropriate way of conceptualising this is to think not 
just in terms of particular individuals and their exercise (or not) of the virtues at the 
institutional level, as MacIntyre does, but also in terms of institutional level virtues 
(and vices), and hence of institutional character. Just as MacIntyre talks of the 
concern for external goods and the acquisitiveness and competitiveness of the 
institution, it seems perfectly possible, by way of analogy or projection (Goodpaster 
& Matthews 1982: 135), or by way of metaphor (Morgan 1997: 4-8 and passim), to 
speak of the institution as having a virtuous or vicious character, or a character that is 
somewhere between these two extremes. Klein comments that, “formal organizations 
can function like a moral person … they potentially have something analogous to 
character, which can be evaluated as virtuous or vicious” (Klein 1988: 56). 
 
A virtuous institutional character, then, might be defined as the seat of the virtues 
necessary for an institution to engage in practices with excellence, focusing on those 
internal goods thereby obtainable, while warding off threats from its own inordinate 
pursuit of external goods and from the corrupting power of other institutions in its 
environment with which it engages (see Moore 2005b). 
 
Taking business organisations as a particular form of institution (one housing what 
MacIntyre, as we have seen, calls “productive crafts”) and drawing from the 
definition of virtuous institutional character given above, the concept of the virtuous 
business organisation can be explored. A business organisation with a virtuous 
character would firstly be aware that it is founded on and has as its most important 
function the sustenance of the particular business practice that it houses. Second, and 
following from this, the organisation would encourage the pursuit of excellence in 
that practice. Third, it would focus on external goods (such as profit and reputation) as 
both a necessary and worthwhile function of the organisation (they are goods, not 
bads), but only to the extent necessary to the sustenance and development of the 
practice. Finally, the organisation would be such as to be able to resist the corrupting 
power of institutions in its environment with which it in turn relates, such as 
competitors, suppliers or those which represent the financial market, where these 
encourage a single-minded concentration on external goods. 
 
Which particular virtues would characterize virtuous business organisations? 
Although we might consider a wider list (Moore (2005b) includes the cardinal virtues, 
for example), it is clear that justice, courage and truthfulness (MacIntyre 1985: 194, 
cited above) are the sine qua non of MacIntyre’s schema, together with the virtues of 
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integrity and constancy (MacIntyre 1999: 317-318) which refer to their consistent 
application across practices and over time. 
 
The virtuous business organisation would require courage in order to resist the 
corrupting power of institutions with which it relates and to minimize the effects of 
the environment on its character where these might be damaging. It would require 
justice in order to distribute external goods appropriately, to weigh its own advantage 
with that of the wider community, to foster its own excellence through (for example) 
an allocation of roles that ensures that those who are truly best at particular tasks are 
appointed to do them, and to generate internal harmony through ensuring that 
subordinates accept the justice of their place (Klein 1988: 60). Solomon’s (1992) 
emphasis on trust (by which we should infer the virtue of both offering trust to others 
and being trustworthy oneself) contains within its definition the necessity of 
truthfulness for the conduct of business. 
 
Such virtues would find their institutional embodiment in a number of features 
(Moore 2005b). These are the requirement of a just purpose for the particular 
practice-institution combination, the development of a power-balanced structure that 
will ensure that the views and desires of particular constituencies are not privileged 
over those of others, and decision-making systems and processes that enable rational 
critical dialogue having the effect of countering biases and enabling the questioning of 
the hitherto unquestioned. In particular, these will allow the organisation not to see 
itself as compartmentalised (MacIntyre 1999: 322) from other institutions in society 
but as one part of a larger whole. While to some extent outside of its control, the 
encouragement of a supportive culture will also be a feature of the character of a 
virtuous business organization (see Moore 2005b for more on the distinction and 
relationship between culture and character). 
 
But, to what extent, and under which kinds of circumstance, would such business 
organisations be possible, or even flourish? 
 
Preconditions for virtuous business organisations 
 
According to MacIntyre: 
 
 “the ability of a practice to retain its integrity will depend on the way in which 
the virtues can be and are exercised in sustaining the institutional forms which 
are the social bearers of the practice. The integrity of a practice causally 
requires the exercise of the virtues by at least some of the individuals who 
embody it in their activities; and conversely the corruption of institutions is 
always in part at least an effect of the vices.” (MacIntyre 1985: 195) 
 
MacIntyre illustrates the contrast between virtuous and vicious business organisations, 
by describing two fishing crews. One is motivated only or overridingly by the pursuit 
of external goods and hence aims at wages for the crew and profit for the owners. The 
second pursues internal goods and is devoted to the particular excellences required by 
the practice of fishing (MacIntyre 1994: 285-286). In the first case, both owners and 
workers would abandon the activity should they find other means of enhancing their 
income. The second crew, however, would subordinate economic goods to an 
allegiance to the continuation of the practice of fishing and the way of life that entails. 
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It is, in other words, the prioritisation of external goods that corrupts the institution 
and threatens the practice. 
 
If this is so, the question then becomes what can be done to maintain an appropriate 
balance between the pursuit of internal and external goods in such a way that the 
institution is able to preserve its practices by ensuring that they are not eroded by the 
inordinate pursuit of external goods. 
 
This, however, raises a further issue. To return to MacIntyre’s fishing crews, because 
both crews fish it is clear that in the very short-term the conduct of the practice 
requires neither the virtues of the practitioners and owners, nor the flourishing of the 
institutions which house the practice – technical expertise and equipment is all that is 
required. However, in the medium- to long-term at least one commentator (Dobson 
1997) suggests that without an appropriate regulatory environment the virtuous 
fishing crew instanced here would not long survive the effects of the other sort – 
crews that would over-fish and then leave in grim parody of the tragedy of the 
commons.  
 
This, then, takes us back to our initial question, which returns in modified form: Why 
do some businesses actively protect the virtues even where this is to the detriment of 
the pursuit of external goods such as profit? And it turns out that the description of 
MacIntyre’s work given above attests to a familiar triad – those of the agent, the 
organisation (institution) and the environment. Any adequate characterisation of either 
virtuous or vicious business organisations will require us to comment on all three of 
these. 
 
Virtuous agents 
 
The first precondition for a virtuous business organisation, then, is the presence of 
virtuous agents at the level of both the practice and the institution, for without agents 
who possess and exercise the virtues the practice itself would no longer be fostered 
internally through the pursuit of excellence, and at the institutional level the 
corruption of the institution and the consequent distortion of the practice would seem 
to be inevitable. This is particularly the case for those agents who hold decision-
making authority in the institution. But the presence of such agents at both practice 
and institutional (managerial) level is clearly insufficient to guarantee the presence of 
organisational virtue. 
 
A conducive mode of institutionalisation 
 
The second precondition for a virtuous business organisation is the mode of 
institutionalisation (MacIntyre 1994: 289, cited above) which distributes both 
decision-making authority and decision criteria within institutions: 
 
“The distribution of power that characterizes a particular institution or 
organization will determine whether the roles and relationship in question 
are or are not instruments of domination or oppression.” (MacIntyre, 
personal correspondence, 27 June 2000) 
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In other words, we would expect that different institutional forms will support to 
different extents the practices which they house, and thereby enable the exercise of 
the virtues and the attainment of internal goods to a greater or lesser degree. 
 
It is this point in particular which has led to much discussion about the possibility or 
otherwise of applying MacIntyre’s virtues-goods-practice-institution schema to 
capitalist business organisations, and this warrants particular discussion at this point. 
MacIntyre’s contention is that in the capitalist forms of business organisation that 
have emerged the institution has, in effect, ‘won’ over the practice – its justification is 
the pursuit of external goods – such that “much modern industrial productive and 
service work is organised so as to exclude the features distinctive of a practice”, and 
in such a way that this type of activity is “at once alien and antagonistic to practices” 
(MacIntyre 1994: 286). 
 
Three related points contribute to this view. First, Public Limited Companies (PLCs) 
operate under a variety of legal obligations but their purpose has (at least within 
Anglo-American capitalism) been clear since the judgment in the 1919 Dodge vs. 
Ford Motor Co. case compelled Henry Ford to issue a dividend rather than cut 
product prices on the basis that “a business corporation is organized and carried on 
primarily for the profit of stockholders” (cited in Dodd 1932). 
 
A range of examples testify to the dominance of the generation of external goods in 
conventional PLCs’ decision-making. Anita Roddick, who founded The Body Shop 
ostensibly around just purposes, has described her decision to go public as a “pact 
with the devil” which has necessitated the abandonment of much campaigning 
activity as well as an emphasis on the ‘bottom line’ that would once have competed 
with other objectives as decision criteria (Bakan 2004: 51-53).  
 
We find similar examples of other companies that do not start from ‘the bottom line’, 
in Waterman’s work. Applied Energy Systems (AES) is described in these terms: 
 
“The founders wanted a company that valued people and acted responsibly, 
that was fair and honest in its approach not only to customers, suppliers, and 
employees, but to the greater society in which we live. If they happened to 
make good profits, so much the better. But that wasn’t their goal – they cared 
more about the kind of company they could build than its bottom line.” 
(Waterman 1994: 111) 
 
AES went public in 1991, but Waterman records that, “[i]t didn’t really want to; the 
fear was that pressures from the outside would weaken the company’s focus on 
values” (Waterman 1994: 135). Levi Strauss, on the other hand, withdrew from the 
restraints of the financial markets by taking itself private in the mid-1980s through a 
leveraged buyout (Waterman 1994: 143) – apparently to avoid some of the pressures, 
including pressure on its values, that concerned AES. Borrowing MacIntyre’s terms 
again, where the capitalist system operates effectively, it represents the victory of the 
goods of effectiveness over those of excellence. 
 
Second is the range of intellectual and moral errors in the process of decision-making 
through which such a victory is institutionalised. Utilitarianism, which acts as the 
decision-making method in bureaucratic organisations, disguises value choices in 
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presenting both the ranking of harms and benefits and the impacts of decisions over 
time as simple facts, subordinates means to ends and routinely excludes externalities 
from the list of consequences to be weighed. In the ordinary conduct of relations in 
such contexts the distinction between manipulative and non-manipulative behaviour is 
thus dissolved (MacIntyre 1964, 1977, 1979, 1985, 1999). 
 
Third is the impact of this on the prospects for moral agency. Here the exclusion of 
both questions and persons from participation in decision-making (see also Jackall 
1988: 6) becomes a feature, perhaps the feature of the moral life of persons whose 
character is compartmentalised (MacIntyre 1977, 1979 and 1999) and whose moral 
agency, the conditions for which require a narrative unity, are critically undermined 
(MacIntyre 1999 passim). As a result: 
 
“Capitalism … provides systematic incentives to develop a type of character 
that has a propensity to injustice.” (MacIntyre 1995: xiv) 
 
These three points provide a very serious critique of capitalist business organisations 
in the form with which MacIntyre is familiar. Despite this, however, the counter 
argument has been made (Moore 2005b) that all business activities, irrespective of 
their form of institutionalisation, must contain the vestiges of a practice and the 
virtues to some degree, for if they did not – that is, if the institution had ‘won’ so 
completely that the virtues had suffered “something near total effacement” (MacIntyre 
1985: 196) – then the institution would have, in effect, killed itself from the inside by 
failing to sustain the practice on which it itself is founded. In other words, while in 
capitalist forms of business organisation the practice may be potentially and 
continually under threat from the acquisitiveness and competitiveness of the 
corporation, it still exists. This counter argument, of course, suggests that MacIntyre 
is overly pessimistic in his assessment. That particular forms of institutionalisation 
may be more or less conducive to the sustenance and development of the practices 
they house, however, would seem to be self-evident and we shall explore this further 
below. 
 
A conducive environment 
 
However, at this stage we need to move on to consider the third precondition for a 
virtuous business organisation. It is clear that MacIntyre regards institutions as open 
systems that are both affected by other institutions in society and able (in both 
positive and negative ways) of compartmentalising themselves from them. It is 
apparent therefore that a particularly significant factor in any organisation’s ability to 
maintain and exercise the virtues and support the practice it houses is the extent to 
which the environment is more or less conducive to such activity. Character at the 
individual level, and by extension at the institutional level, is “vulnerable to 
environment”, although as Solomon notes, “it is also a bulwark against environment” 
(Solomon 2003: 46). Hence, we would expect that an unconducive environment 
would be problematic for organisational virtue. 
 
A starting point is to ask whether the environment (regulatory, market, labour and 
capital) discriminates between organisations in ways related to their exercise of the 
virtues and protection of practices. Consider, for example, an unusual business 
institution that arguably exhibits many of the characteristics of a practice-based 
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community, the travelling circus (Beadle 2003). These include the necessity of 
apprenticeship (Carmeli 1991), an emphasis on tradition in the discourse of circus 
artists and in particular in the idea of circus as being everywhere “the same” (Carmeli 
1997: 8, 2001: 160, 2003: 82) and the primacy accorded to internal goods in the 
socially accepted understanding of “goodness” in circus (Stroud 1999; Beadle 2003). 
Like some of the examples of practice-based communities cited by MacIntyre, circus 
is totalising inasmuch as its members’ working, communal and family lives are 
conducted in the same community (Stroud 1999 passim; Davis 2002: 10; Carmeli 
1987: 870)  
 
The British circus faces a hostile regulatory and market environment in which the 
grounds available for its work have been restricted by local authority and other 
landowners due to concerns about use of animals (Stroud 1999; Carmeli 1997). This 
may be seen as the environment responding to continuing questioning of the circus’s 
just purpose. As an additional example Carmeli (1987) reports that an environment in 
which audiences no longer distinguish between the quality of either individual 
circuses or individual acts discourages artists and owners from investing in props, 
tricks and improvements in customer service. 
 
Unlike our earlier example from Ronnie Scott’s, many of whose patrons might leave 
should their enjoyment of the practice be interrupted by noise from other customers, 
there are limited utilitarian grounds for circus owners to protect and enhance the 
internal goods being produced. The labour market has, in response, simply moved, 
with many recognized artists now working in Europe or the USA where the circus is 
more popular and greater product differentiation is evident (Stroud 1999). 
 
An ethically responsive environment, which some may claim is evidenced by the 
impact of the animal rights movement on circus, will encourage institutions to act 
virtuously. An ethically neutral environment, which some may claim is evidenced by 
the failure of English audiences to appreciate the distinctive circus virtues of dexterity 
and fortitude that artists exhibit, will provide no utilitarian reasons for institutions to 
act virtuously and a vicious environment, as documented by Davis’s (2002) study of 
the maltreatment of people of colour and those with disabilities in the American 
circuses in the 19th and early 20th centuries, will encourage the institution to act 
viciously. 
 
The mechanism involved here is variation in the distribution of external goods 
through the market. Its effectiveness depends on the economic vulnerability of the 
institution to such variation and the virtues of those with decision-making authority 
within them. Hence, Dobson’s forlorn comment that the virtuous firm, if placed in a 
competitive market environment, “would rapidly perish” (Dobson 1996: 227), is 
predicated on an ethically neutral or vicious environment. MacIntyre himself warns: 
“We should therefore expect that, if in a particular society the pursuit of external 
goods were to become dominant, the concept of the virtues might suffer first attrition 
and then perhaps something near total effacement, although simulacra might abound” 
(MacIntyre 1985: 196).   
 
In other words, a society in which a vice such as avarice has been, in effect, 
legitimised, would provide such an unhealthy environment that even the presence of 
virtuous agents together with a supportive mode of institutionalisation, might not be 
 11
sufficient to ensure the existence of organisational virtue. It is MacIntyre’s contention 
that such legitimising of avarice has become ubiquitous in modern capitalist society 
(MacIntyre 1995: xiii). And while, again, MacIntyre’s assessment may be viewed as 
overly pessimistic, it points to the importance of a conducive environment within 
which organisational virtue may flourish. 
 
One further point that merits consideration here relates to the work of institutional 
theorists. DiMaggio and Powell’s seminal article questioned the “startling 
homogeneity of organizational forms and practices” (1983: 148) and defined 
institutional isomorphism as “a constraining process that forces one unit in a 
population to resemble other units that face the same set of environmental conditions” 
(DiMaggio and Powell 1983: 149). 
 
However, as Nelson & Gopalan have observed, while organisations are subject to 
isomorphic pressures, “they also maintain boundaries, which distinguish them from 
their environment and provide a separate identity” – indeed, “[w]ithout such boundary 
maintenance, the organization will dissolve” (2003: 1119). They also note the 
existence (in the sociology of religion and social movements rather than in 
organisation studies) of “reciprocal opposition” where organisational values and 
institutional forms are developed “whose features form an inverse image of each other 
… [t]he oppositional group adopts symbols and social structures that are the 
reciprocal opposite of those used by the dominant group” (Nelson & Gopalan 2003: 
1120). This suggests that, while a conducive environment is clearly beneficial to 
organisational virtue, it may be possible for organisations to resist their environment, 
or potentially to create around themselves a more conducive environment than most 
organisations experience. We will return to this point below. 
 
Conclusion 
 
Having now constructed the conceptual framework within which the concept of 
organisational virtue can be explored – a heuristic device involving three levels – the 
questions that remain are essentially empirical. What kind of inter-relationships exist 
between the three preconditions for institutional virtue; to what extent is the strength 
of presence of one or another precondition able to off-set deficiencies in other factors; 
what kinds of modes of institutionalisation are more or less conducive to 
organisational virtue; how precarious is organisational virtue; and are there particular 
mechanisms that might be supportive of organisational virtue thus allowing it to 
become embedded?  
 
Such questions suggest a significant research agenda and in the remainder of this 
paper we can only hint at some empirical observations that make an initial 
contribution. We do so by describing a virtuous organisation and exploring the 
preconditions for this attribution using our three-level heuristic device. The research 
method associated with this is that of participant observation, one of the authors 
having had a long association with the organisation and the Fair Trade movement of 
which it is a part, and being a member of the Board as a non-executive director. 
 
Assessing the virtuous business organisation: Traidcraft plc 
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Traidcraft was founded in 1979 by a group of Christians as a trading business seeking 
to respond to poverty in the developing world through trade. It emerged from a mail 
order and wholesale operation owned by the development charity TEARfund. 
Traidcraft rapidly expanded its product range and developed an extensive network of 
volunteer sales representatives. It later set up an educational and development charity 
(Traidcraft Exchange) which offers training, consultancy and information services 
related to Fair Trade. Christian philosophy remains central to Traidcraft’s work with a 
significant majority of Christians in the 5,000 strong national network of volunteers 
(“Fair Traders”) selling products in their churches, schools and homes. A similar 
number of individual investors, many of whom are Christians, have provided its £5 
million capital base. Traidcraft has very little institutional investment, but is 
nonetheless a Public Limited Company with its shares tradable through an 
independent stock-broking firm. 
 
Traidcraft plc is committed to working with people of all faiths or none. It sees itself 
as a community of supporters, shareholders, customers, professionals and producers 
aiming to reduce poverty by trading with hundreds of small craft producers and 
farmers in over 30 countries. Its mission, “fighting poverty through trade”, 
encapsulates this. Traidcraft also advocates on behalf of poor producers and 
campaigns to change unfair conditions of trade and make trade rules work in the 
interests of the poor. Traidcraft has been a leading organisation in the Fair Trade 
movement and was a founder member of the International Fair Trade Association 
(IFAT) and the European Fair Trade Association (EFTA) – see Moore (2004) for a 
fuller description and analysis of the Fair Trade movement. 
 
Traidcraft plc claims to be the leading Fair Trade organisation in the U.K. with sales 
in 2004/05 over £15.5 million. In line with Fair Trade sales around the world, 
Traidcraft plc’s product mix by category is 71% food and beverages (including tea, 
coffee and wine as well as combination food products such as snack bars), 12% crafts 
and clothing, and 16% paper products. It sells approximately 47% of its turnover by 
value through Fair Trader volunteers, 13% by mail order, 14% through retail and 26% 
via wholesale of which 11% (of the total) is via supermarkets, although this 
marginally underestimates this channel due to a recent licensing agreement. In 
2004/05 its turnover grew by 12% and it achieved a pre-tax surplus of £530,000 
(Traidcraft 2005 and internal papers). 
 
Traidcraft is made up of three linked organisations: in addition to the share-based 
trading company and the Traidcraft Exchange charity, there is the Traidcraft 
Foundation, a charitable Trust which holds a Guardian Share in Traidcraft plc with a 
veto on appointments to the Board and the ability to limit some specific transactions 
including the level of shareholder dividend payments. In line with its Christian basis, 
all non-executive and executive directors are required to be practicing Christians. 
Although this requirement does not apply to other levels in the organisation, many 
employees are also Christians and there is an overt emphasis on religious matters 
within the firm. Most of the 130 or so permanent staff are located in Gateshead, an 
economically disadvantaged region within the U.K. Four policy staff are located in 
London. The organisation achieved Investors in People status during 2004 at its first 
attempt, with only very minor areas where developments were recommended – a 
considerable achievement. (Investors in People is “a business improvement tool 
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designed to advance an organisation’s performance through its people” 
(http://www.iipuk.co.uk, accessed 4 October 2005). 
 
The three arms of the Traidcraft organisation are linked by a Deed of Mutual 
Covenant based on core foundational principles. These are that: 
 
• Traidcraft is a Christian response to poverty 
• Our mission is fighting poverty through trade 
• We respect all people and the environment 
• We abide by and promote fair business practices 
• We strive to be transparent and accountable  
(http://www.traidcraft.co.uk, accessed 4 October 2005) 
 
How does this description of Traidcraft relate to the preconditions for organisational 
virtue? First, in terms of the mode of institutionalisation, it is clear that Traidcraft plc, 
as the trading arm of the organisation, has established an institutional architecture that 
quite deliberately limits the focus on external goods. This is not to say that there is no 
focus on these goods – Traidcraft plc’s history in which successive losses almost 
brought the organisation to its knees has led to a more balanced approach and an 
appropriate degree of attention to sales and bottom line figures. But, as a mirror image 
of conventional capitalist business, the ‘bottom line’ is regarded as a means to an end. 
 
For example, one of the key figures that the organisation reports on and targets is the 
increased value of purchases from developing countries, and this reinforces the 
emphasis on the producers that is at the core of the organisation’s purpose rather than 
on shareholder value. The limit placed on dividends and the Guardian Share provision 
that prevents a ‘carpet-bagging’ takeover, similarly indicate the way in which a limit 
on external goods has been, quite literally, institutionalised. 
 
In terms of the features of a virtuous organisational character, the existence of a just 
purpose and a power-balanced structure are in evidence from the above description. 
Identifying systems and processes that counter biases and enable the questioning of 
the hitherto unquestioned, and observing the encouragement of a supportive culture 
are rather harder without some form of ethnographic study, but the recent 
achievement of Investors in People status suggests that these are also well in hand. 
Furthermore, based on one of the author’s first-hand experience, the effective 
functioning of the Board in bringing to bear a range of perspectives from outside the 
immediate concerns of the organisation suggests that a questioning culture exists. 
 
In relation to the corporate virtues it is clear from the above description that justice is 
carefully nurtured and exercised. If part of this virtue is the prudent allocation of 
resources then, as noted above, prudence has been exercised over recent years in 
establishing an appropriate balance between the achievement of internal and external 
goods. Courage is in evidence in its dealings with mainstream organisations such as 
the supermarkets where the approach of Fair Trade needs to be defended. Finally, the 
existence of integrity (exercising the same virtues across different practices) might be 
observed in the mutually enriching co-existence of a charity and trading company, 
and constancy (the same virtues exercised over time) is evident in the consistent 
emphasis on its core mission of fighting poverty through trade. 
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Traidcraft plc’s mode of institutionalisation, therefore, seems to support the 
achievement of a virtuous organisational character. The next precondition for 
organisational virtue which we need to consider, that of a conducive environment, 
follows immediately from this. For while Traidcraft plc operates in many ways within 
the normal context for most businesses – banking arrangements, legal requirements 
for aspects such as employment practices, pensions, audit and taxation, buying 
organisations and consumers who are looking for value for money – it is nonetheless 
clear that in several important respects it operates within a more conducive 
environment than many other business organisations. By not participating in the 
normal financial market for shares the company avoids the pressure to maximise 
profits, and instead has supportive shareholders who have invested on the 
understanding that the financial return is likely to be limited – a first dividend for 
many years of 2.5p per share (2.5%) was declared in 2004 and repeated in 2005 and 
shares trade at approximately par value. 
 
In addition to this, although the company deals with mainstream organisations such as 
supermarkets, where prices may come under pressure and quality standards are 
exacting, many of its customers such as its own Fair Traders network and ‘World 
Shops’ to which it sells, are highly supportive of the organisation and its mission. 
Similarly, a conducive labour market sees many employees working at Traidcraft not 
because of the financial rewards (which tend to be at the lower end of the scale), but 
because they also ‘buy into’ the organisation’s mission. Equally, the relationship with 
producer organisations in the developing world is regarded as one of partnership 
rather than dependency, and while the producers are generally very clear that 
maximisation of their incomes through fair prices (often above the local price) and 
increasing and consistent volumes is a key part of the relationship, they too are 
strongly supportive of Traidcraft plc and its mission. This suggests that Traidcraft plc 
has been able to establish what we might refer to as a ‘micro-climate’ within its 
environment in which financial, consumer, labour and supply markets are rather more 
‘friendly’ than is commonly the case. 
 
With reference to the concepts of institutional isomorphism and reciprocal opposition 
discussed above, it may well be that in Traidcraft plc’s case, in both its origins and its 
subsequent development, there has been a quite deliberate fostering of this sense of 
reciprocal opposition and that this has been instrumental both in the institutional form 
that has been constructed and in the establishment of a micro-climate that is more 
conducive of institutional virtue. 
 
What, then, of the presence of virtuous agents within the organisation? Again, without 
a detailed ethnographic study this is not particularly easy to assess. The strong 
Christian emphasis, however, means that many of the key individuals in the 
organisation have a strong faith-based set of values and it is undoubtedly true that 
many see working at Traidcraft as an opportunity to apply these values consistently, 
as much in their working lives as elsewhere. In terms of the virtues-goods-practice-
institution schema this could be redescribed in terms of the consistent exercise of 
virtues across different practices in the context of a narrative quest towards their own 
telos. That these kinds of agents exist at both the level of the practice and the 
institution is clear, and there is both an appropriate degree of focus on the excellence 
of the practice of being a Fair Trade business, and a healthy level of (usually positive) 
criticism from those engaged in the practice towards those who represent the 
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institution (the management) to suggest that the integrity of the practice, which 
“causally requires the exercise of the virtues by at least some of the individuals who 
embody it in their activities” (MacIntyre 1985: 195, cited above) in order to ward off 
the threat from the institution’s inordinate pursuit of external goods, is secure. 
 
 
 
Conclusions 
 
We have suggested that any attempt to explore the concept of organisational virtue in 
business requires an integrating framework, a heuristic device within which fruitful 
discussion may be conducted. Our contention has been that MacIntyre’s virtues-
goods-practice-institution schema provides such a conceptual framework and that 
within this framework the focal point for the exercise of virtue is the practice. Within 
any practice-institution combination, however, there are, in fact, two practices. The 
first is the practice at the core of the activity – farming or fishing, architecture or 
construction, or whatever. The second is the practice of making and sustaining the 
institution itself. We then identified three preconditions necessary for a virtuous 
business organisation: the presence of virtuous agents at both the practice and 
institutional levels; a conducive mode of institutionalisation that, in particular, 
prioritized internal goods (a focus on the practice) while maintaining sufficient 
attention to external goods to ensure an appropriate balance of the two; and, thirdly, a 
conducive environment within which organisational virtue might flourish. 
 
In our discussion of circus organisations we noted how organisations that might well 
have agents, at both practice and institutional levels, with an appropriate focus on the 
practice at their core, and might equally well have an appropriate mode of 
institutionalisation that would foster the practice, could find themselves unable to 
sustain the virtuous organisation because of the lack of a conducive environment. This 
suggests that all three preconditions are indeed necessary. 
 
In our discussion of capitalist business organisations we noted that both an 
unconducive environment (including, in particular, the financial markets), that 
encourages a single-minded focus on external goods, and a mode of 
institutionalisation that also tends to be dominated by a focus on external goods rather 
than the practice and its internal goods, suggests that even the presence of virtuous 
agents at both the level of the practice and the institution would be unlikely to enable 
the achievement of a virtuous business organisation. Capitalist business organisations, 
as MacIntyre has argued, seem to be largely antithetical to the development of 
practices. Nonetheless, we held out hope even here by observing that the institution 
must contain the vestiges of a practice and the virtues to some degree, a counter 
argument, of course, that suggests that MacIntyre may be overly pessimistic in his 
assessment. 
 
The evidence provided in our earlier discussions of Public Limited Companies, which 
contrasted those which had become public companies with those that had taken 
themselves private, suggests that it is partially within a corporation’s power to create 
or choose its own environment. 
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In beginning to answer some of the empirical questions that derive from the 
conceptual framework and preconditions for organisational virtue, what is particularly 
evident from our case study of Traidcraft plc is the way in which the three 
preconditions for organisational virtue can be self-reinforcing. Starting with a mode of 
institutionalisation that is doubtless conducive to organisational virtue, the 
organisation has managed, perhaps as a result, to create what we termed a micro-
climate which provides a largely conducive environment within which organisational 
virtue might flourish and in “reciprocal opposition” to other organisations facing a 
more hostile environment. This reinforces the point that corporations may, to some 
extent, be able to create or choose their own environment, and that exercising this 
discretion is a feature that we might expect to find in the virtuous corporation. 
Perhaps as a result of exercising this discretion with respect to its environment and in 
the creation of a conducive mode of institutionalisation, Traidcraft plc attracts agents 
at both the level of the practice and the institution who reinforce organisational virtue 
– although the causal direction cannot be substantiated here. 
 
This would suggest that, where all three preconditions are present, organisational 
virtue is unlikely to be precarious. Even a considerable change in one of the factors – 
for example, the employment of a Chief Executive who, once in post, sought to drive 
the organisation towards a much more commercial orientation, with a much stronger 
focus on the achievement of external goods – would seem unlikely to have much 
impact. More likely would be the expulsion of such a person as the other factors came 
into play to preserve the organisation’s virtue. Equally, the Traidcraft plc case study 
demonstrates the sense in embedding organisational virtue in such things as 
governance structures, rather than relying solely upon individual agents to preserve it. 
As such it indicates one mechanism for such a process of embedding – a mechanism 
that Keeley (2000) has already suggested. 
 
We indicated at the outset that we would be unable to address in any depth two other 
points that arise from MacIntyre’s work. In relation to other forms of bureaucratic 
organisation, all we can tentatively suggest here is that the virtues-goods-practice-
institution schema is generic such that its application to other forms of organisation, 
and the preconditions for institutional virtue that we have identified, would be equally 
applicable in, for example, government and non-profit organisations. Similarly, we 
would expect that MacIntyre’s critique of managers, and the answer that we propose 
in terms of the key role of management as the practice of making and sustaining the 
institution, would be generically applicable. The extent to which different forms of 
capitalism are more or less conducive to organisational virtue is, again, something that 
we have not been able to address directly. Forms of capitalist societies that are less 
directed towards the achievement of external goods, and accompanying modes of 
institutionalisation, would, on our analysis, be more conducive of institutional virtue, 
but we have been unable here to present even circumstantial evidence in support of 
this claim. 
 
If, however, MacIntyre’s conceptual framework, and its development and application 
to organisational life in general and business organisations in particular, has 
something to offer, (as we believe it does), then, as we have both outlined and begun 
to explore above, the questions that remain are largely empirical. We invite others, 
then, to join us in that empirical quest. 
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